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This paper oﬀers an alternative approach to the existence of sunspot
equilibria. The economy has a single perishable good and ﬁat money
within an overlapping generations framework with two possible extrane-
ous events. The analysis uses the dynamic adjustment of market prices
during voluntary trade to establish paths of current spot prices whose
limit points are rational expectations equilibria. The paper shows that
t h e r ei sas u b - s e to fp a t h sw h o s el i m i tp o i n t sa r es e l f - f u l ﬁlling if they are
perfectly correlated with extraneous events. It is this sub-set that consti-
tutes sunspot equilibria. Two implications of this approach follow: (a) the
likelihood of this existence is generally low; and (b) adding an asset (or a
commodity) to the economy invalidates the demonstration of existence.
KEYWORDS: Sunspot equilibria, extrinsic uncertainty, dynamic sta-
bility.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D00, D50, D80.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The sunspot literature oﬀers no clear understanding of sunspots themselves; it
is clear, however, that sunspots render the economic environment uncertain.
Put diﬀerently, the source of price randomness in the economy is extraneous
uncertainty. In these terms, the randomness of prices is a consequence of agents’
beliefs with respect to sunspot events. By deﬁnition a sunspot equilibrium is
a rational expectations equilibrium that is perfectly correlated with extraneous
events. Accordingly, sunspot equilibria must have existed whenever agents’
subjective beliefs of future prices are subsequently proven correct.
The sunspot literature (for a survey see Chaippori and Guesnerie (1991)
and the references thereof; see also Evans and Hankapohja (2001), pp. 287-
313) contains diverse and sometimes apparently unrelated strands. This paper
focuses on one of these: sunspot equilibria in inﬁnite horizon sequential models.
This literature utilizes a two period overlapping generations framework in an
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1economy with a representative agent whose inter-temporal budget comprises a
perishable good and ﬁat money (this framework will also form the basis for
our discussion). Chaippori and Guesnerie (1991) observe that this strand of
the sunspot literature is particularly interesting for two reasons. Within the
overlapping generations framework (a) the inﬁnite horizon is better adapted
than a ﬁnite horizon to study expectations formation; since a ﬁnite horizon,
with expectations linked to some ﬁnal period, is problematic; and (b) agents
of diﬀerent generations trade and deliver goods while their life times overlap,
therefore it makes no sense to insure away sunspot events.
The key issue here is not the obvious fact that agents form expectations
based on subjective beliefs; rather, it is the self-fulﬁlment of those beliefs. In
the literature, certain classes of models were designed to establish the existence
of sunspot equilibria (e.g., Gottardi and Kajii (1999)). In particular, a special
relationship between inter-temporal income eﬀects and substitution eﬀects was
imposed to establish the existence of market clearing prices in an environment
of extraneous uncertainty.
An alternative approach to the existence of sunspot equilibria, based on
dynamic stability considerations, is suggested here. The economic framework
resembles that of the abovementioned literature (speciﬁcally, Spear (1984)). An
overlapping generations model with two periods forms the basis for discussion.
Assume that each period (generation) is of a ﬁnite length; and that during
each period current prices adjust and plans are revised. Demographically, the
economy comprises a representative individual (agent) of the young generation
and a representative individual of the old generation, or any replica of the
two. During the ﬁrst period of his life the individual plans his inter-temporal
consumption, using a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function.
Assume an extrinsic random process in the form of a stationary Markov
chain with two possible states, sunspot and non-sunspot. The young individual
who plans for the future believes that the market clearing price is perfectly
correlated with the state of the sunspot. This paper investigates whether the
young individual’s beliefs are self-fulﬁlling; and therefore, whether extraneous
stochastic equilibria exist. This paper follows Radner (e.g., 1982) in establishing
the existence of a sequence of temporary equilibria where the life times of the
two representative individuals overlap; though the source of uncertainty is here
extrinsic rather than intrinsic.
Given the Markov chain of future subjective beliefs, the existence of sunspot
equilibria is predicated upon two observations:
1. The known (Spear (1984)) observation that future consumption of the
young individual is determined solely by the state of future sunspots,
irrespective of the state of current sunspots. Clearly, this observation
requires restricting the individual’ utilities, a special relationship between
inter-temporal income and substitution eﬀects should be imposed.
2. There is voluntary trade that is always feasible. The paper shows that
when young and old representative individuals trade in the direction of
2their excess demands, there is trade that is always consistent with price
taking optimizing behaviour. Hence, current spot prices are dynamically
stable. A set of time paths of dynamically stable current spot prices will
then be formed.
Based on the above two observations and given two extraneous events (sunspot
or non-sunspot), sunspot equilibria occur at the limit of some time paths within
the above set of dynamically stable paths.1
The paper will also show that, in general, the set of sunspot equilibria is
insigniﬁcant in size. Sunspot equilibria are consequently unlikely to occur and
their existence is not, therefore, signiﬁcant. Moreover, when one adds more
assets or goods to the economy, the above existence result, in general, fails.2
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the monetary overlap-
ping generations model that forms the basis of this discussion. Section 3 states
the main results of the paper. In the remainder of the paper, two propositions
are presented. The ﬁrst suggests a method to demonstrate the existence of
sunspot equilibria in a dynamic competitive equilibrium framework. The proof
rests on dynamic stability considerations and requires the validation of a claim.
The claim, presented in section 4, has two parts. The ﬁrst part (4.1) derives the
set of admissible current spot prices under voluntary trade between young and
old individuals, where the criterion for admissibility is the feasibility of volun-
tary trade. The second part (4.2) establishes that, within this set, there exist
speciﬁc time paths of current spot prices that satisfy the suﬃciency conditions
for dynamic stability.
Section 5 shows that sunspot equilibria exist, but in general, are unlikely
to occur. It starts (5.1) with a proof of the abovementioned ﬁrst proposition;
namely that, when individuals’ beliefs are extraneous, dynamic stability of cur-
rent spot prices is suﬃcient for the existence of sunspot equilibria, provided the
future consumption of the young individual is determined solely by the state of
future sunspots and is independent of current sunspots.
The second proposition, (5.2), states that, in general, sunspot equilibria are
unlikely to occur. It is followed by a corollary (5.3), showing that the inclusion
of an extra asset (e.g., a bond) to the economy will generally render the ﬁrst
proposition invalid.
2T h e M o d e l
The overlapping generations model is now commonly used as a framework for
the study of dynamics in real time. Such a pure exchange framework with
1Note that the dynamic adjustment here is only a means to establish paths of current spot
prices whose limit points are equilibrium (market clearing) prices. The equilibrium prices of
these paths are eﬀectively rational expectations equilibria; and within them there is a sub-set
of paths whose limit points are self-fulﬁlling if they are perfectly correlated with extraneous
events. It is this sub-set that constitutes sunspot equilibria.
2There has been an earlier attempt to expand the economy to N commodities and prove
the existence of sunspot equilibria under speciﬁc conditions (Guesnerie (1986)).
3constant population and without bequests is assumed here. There exist two
identical individuals, one individual of each generation, each of whom lives for
two generations (periods). Thus, in each period there exist two individuals
h = a,b (or any replica of them); one old (h = b) and one young (h = a). The
old born in period t − 1 and the young born in the present period t (where t =
1,2,3,... are consecutive periods). Here it is assumed that t = 1 is the present
period and t =2is the future period. There is one perishable consumption
good. Consumption is denoted by c. The individual is endowed with a ﬁxed
quantity ω1 of the consumption good in period 1 and with ω2 in period 2.T h e
young individual’s inter-temporal utility is u(c1,c 2) , where the subscripts 1 and
2 indicate the present period and the future period, respectively; u is smooth,
monotone and concave function. Note that the superscript a is omitted here
without obscuring clarity. The current price of the good is p and its expected
future price is ps , where s is the state of a future event. We assume that p and
ps belong to an interval of positive values [ε,¯ ε].Ac o n s t a n ts t o c ko fﬁat money
M > 0 in the economy is initially held entirely by the old individual. The young
saves by trading some of his current endowment for ﬁat money presently held
by the old.
The economic activity takes place in the current spot markets of consumption
and money. The decision problem of the young individual is to maximize his
inter-temporal utility given his present and expected future budget constraints,
p(c1 − ω1)+md
1 ≤ 0 and ps (c2 − ω2) − md
1 ≤ 0 (1)
Thus, at any date t the decision problem of the young is to choose his desired
consumption c1, his demand for money 3 md
1 and his future consumption c2.
Maximization of the individual’s inter-temporal utility subject to (1) yields his
present and future commodity excess demands z1 (ρ) ≡ c1−ω1,z 2 (ρ) ≡ c2−ω2
where ρ ≡ p/ps ; and his demand for money md
1 (p,ps). Market excess demand
for consumption is z ≡ z1 + z2. Clearly, ρ (or equivalently the individual’s
expected real interest rate ρ − 1) is the only parameter in the decision making
of the young individual. Accordingly, the individual’s demand for money is md
1
(p,ps) ≡− pz1 (ρ) ≡ psz2 (ρ) and hence Walras’ law ρz1 (ρ)+z2 (ρ) ≡ 0 holds
for every ρ>0.
Under extrinsic uncertainty this maximization assumes the following form.
2.1 Extrinsic Uncertainty
The theory of extrinsic uncertainty is based on the behavioural proposition that
individuals form subjective beliefs about future economic outcomes (e.g., the
future price) in an environment whose structure (i.e., endowments and prefer-
ences) is fully certain. Thus, all individuals share a common subjective belief
on the origins of uncertainties that inﬂuence future economic outcomes.
3Although money is not an argument in the inter-temporal utility function, it is obviously
an argument in the indirect utility function.
4The sunspot literature assumes a random process of extrinsic events in the
economy. Speciﬁcally, it assumes that the young individual knows that the ran-
dom process of extrinsic events follows an exogenous stationary Markov process






where πsθ+πsδ =1for s = θ,δ. It is further assumed that the young individual
believes in stationary and perfect correlations between market clearing price and
natural events (both, sunspots or non-sunspots). The young individual therefore
associates the sunspot with a price pθ = φ(θ) (where φ is a function that
translates the young individual’s forecast (belief) into a price), and associates a
non-sunspot natural event with a price pδ = φ(δ).
The notion behind the existence of sunspot equilibrium is the following:
1. When the young individual’s beliefs, as expressed by the prices φ(θ) and
φ(δ) ,a r es e l f - f u l ﬁlling then these beliefs deﬁne a rational expectations
equilibrium. If in addition,
2. these beliefs are indeed stochastic (i.e., φ(θ) 6= φ(δ) ), then φ(θ) and φ(δ)
constitute a sunspot equilibrium.
Given the Markov process π , the young individual’s objective function is to












4, s = θ, δ subject to








1 s,s ∈ {θ,δ}
where m
d(s)
1 is the young individual’s money demand in state s; css
2 is the second
period consumption given that the current state is s and the previous state was
s (the state where the individual was born); and that prices are assumed to
depend only on states θ and δ.
Solving the above maximization problem yields the current demand for con-
sumption cs
1 and the expected demand for consumption css
2 ,s,s ∈ {θ,δ}.
3 The main results of the paper
The basis for analysis will be the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
of the young individual, where uncertainty is merely a basis for constructing
4This von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function is suited to addressing the is-
sue of extraneous uncertainty in the sense that sunspot activity has no direct eﬀect on the
individual’s well-being. That is, the individual is interested only in payoﬀs and their respec-
tive probabilities; and the only eﬀect that the usual outcome of sunspot activity has on u is
through its eﬀect on the actual value of c . Moreover, the separable form of the expected
utility function implies that the consumption plan is inter-temporally consistent (on this issue
of consistency see Donaldson and Selden (1981); Cass and Shell (1983)).
5lotteries. The underlying utility, u, in the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility is independent of sunspot activity. Consequently, for a given today’s
(current) event, the constrained maximization (2) can be separated into two
constrained maximization problems: a deterministic constrained maximization
when the future event is sunspot and a deterministic constrained maximization
when the future event is non-sunspot. The two outcomes can then be combined
by the probabilities within π.
B a s e do nt h eM a r k o vp r o c e s sπ, there are four combinations of prices that
should be examined when the existence of sunspot equilibria is concerned. The
two obvious cases are (i) today’s event is sunspot and tomorrow’s event is also
sunspot; and (ii) today’s event is non-sunspot and tomorrow’s event is also non-
sunspot. The two other cases are (iii) today’s event is sunspot and tomorrow’s
event is non-sunspot; and (iv) today’s event is non-sunspot and tomorrow’s
event is sunspot. The existence of a sunspot equilibrium depends on whether
current spot market equilibrium prices (see deﬁnition 1 below) exist in each of
the four cases.
To start with, time ﬂow is introduced into each period. The length of the
periodis[0,1] with τ [0,1] added as a continuous time variable that runs through
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: ps = pδª
the
time (in τ) paths of current spot prices when today’s event is, respectively, non-
sunspot and sunspot; and while the future event is, respectively, sunspot and
non-sunspot. The initial prices in each path are, respectively, pδ (0) and pθ (0).
We accordingly deﬁne current spot market equilibrium prices (in any time
period t).
Deﬁnition 1 C u r r e n ts p o tm a r k e te q u i l i b r i u mp r i c e s(in any time t) are
two current spot prices, pδ
t and pθ









t are, respectively, the young and the old individ-
uals’ current excess demands for consumption). In eﬀect pδ
t and pθ
t are rational





t 6=0 ,s= θ,δ.
Deﬁnition 2 Time paths of current spot prices are dynamically stable in
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5Strictly speaking, in (3) time τ should approach inﬁnity. The imposition τ → 1 is only
an approximation to dynamic stability.
6where pδ
t and pθ
t are current spot market equilibrium prices in period t.
We assume that each time path of prices in (3) is constructed such that it is
continuous and unique in its respective initial price
¡
pδ (0),p θ (0)
¢





Accordingly, we deﬁne a sunspot equilbrium.
Deﬁnition 3 A sunspot euqilibrium is current spot market equilibrium prices
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2 s = θ,δ (5)
Deﬁnition 3 requires explanation. The ﬁrst time path of prices in (4) states that
if today’s event is non-sunspot, then given pθ as the price of a future sunspot
event, there should be a time path of today’s (current) prices whose limit point
is pδ (as appears in the second time path of prices in (4)). The second time
path of prices in (4) is constructed similarly. That is, if today’s event is sunspot,
then given pδ as the price of a future non-sunspot event, there should be a time
path of today’s prices whose limit point is pθ (as appears in the ﬁrst time
path of prices in (4)). Equation (5) states that the future consumption depends
only on the future natural event (sunspot or non-sunspot) and is independent
of the current natural event (as originally been pointed out by Spear (1984)).
By construction, (4) and (5) are necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of
sunspot equilibria.7
The remainder of the paper presents two propositions and a corollary.
Proposition 4 W h e n( 5 )i ss a t i s ﬁed, there exist prices pθ
t = pθ and pδ
t =
pδ,p θ 6= pδ, that maintain (4). That is, sunspot equilibrium exists.
Proposition 4 states that there exist two expected prices, pδ and pθ ,s u c h
that, the limit of the ﬁrst (second) time path of prices in (4) is the expected
price in the second (ﬁrst) time path. That is, the limit of each time path
of prices, given an extraneous event (sunspot or non-sunspot), constitutes a
sunspot equilibrium.










in deﬁnition 3. In deﬁnition 2 the limit prices pδ
t and pθ
t need not, in
general, coincide with the respective prices pδ and pθthat appear in the Markov process π .
The limit prices in deﬁnition 3, however, do coincide with those that appear in π.
7The condition of equation (4) states that the current young individual will clear his future
excess demands (when he is old) at prices pδ and pθ provided the future young individual
will be willing to provide these excess demands at these prices. The condition of equation
(5) states that the future young individual will indeed clear his excess demands at the above
prices. Hence, pδ and pθ are sunspot equilibrium prices.
7The proof of proposition 4 is based on dynamic considerations at disequi-
librium of current spot prices. Accordingly we assume that at disequilibrium,





∀τ ∈ [0,1] (6)
where zs




t (τ) is the current spot market excess demand for
the good, where H is a sign preserving continuous function and where a dot is
the operation d
dτ .
Although it is suﬃcient to use (6) as a means for analysis of dynamic sta-
bility, here, nevertheless, we utilize voluntary trade (as expressed in deﬁnition
5 below) along the price adjustment process. The aim of the introduction of
voluntary trade at disequilibrium prices is two fold: (a) voluntary trade is a
manifestation of the optimizing behaviour of the individuals; as such, voluntary
trade between the young and the old individuals is an essential part of the over-
lapping generations model; and (b) the introduction of voluntary trade during
the adjustment of prices (6), explains clearly (as is shown in section 5.3) why
dynamic stability, in general, fails when we depart from the stylized framework
of the economy.
Some deﬁnitions are now in order.
Deﬁnition 5 8A trade between the young and the old individuals is called feasi-
ble, if at disequilibrium prices, ps
t (τ) , the young individual’s trade, ˙ ω
a(s)
t (τ)dτ,
satisﬁes the following conditions simultaneously:











t (τ) 6=0 .
[b]Trade between the young and the old price taking individuals is carried
out on the basis of quid pro quo: the nominal value of the young individual’s
receipts should equal the nominal value of payments. That is,
ps
t (τ) ˙ ω
a(s)
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are admissible if each maintains deﬁnition 5 of fea-
sible trade while (6) takes place.
The proof of proposition 4 requires the validation of the following claim.
8Trade that maintains the conditions of deﬁnition 5, while prices change according to (6),
is sometimes termed the Hahn process. A suﬃcient condition for dynamic stability is then
that individuals’ indirect utilities decline monotonically at disequilibrium prices (e.g., Arrow
and Hahn (1971), pp. 337-345)).
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that satisfy the suﬃciency conditions for dynamic stability as in deﬁnition 2.
(This will be shown in section IV.)
Proposition 4 will then be presented in section 5.1. We conclude section 5.1
with the following proposition 8 and a corollary.
Proposition 8 In general, sunspot equilibria are unlikely to occur. (This will
be presented in section 5.2.)
Proposition 8 states that although sunspot equilibria exist in this economy,
they are unlikely to occur when π is not stationary.
Corollary 9 Adding an extra asset to the economy renders, in general, propo-
sition 4 invalid. (This will be presented in section 5.3.)
4 Dynamic stability of admissible time paths of
c u r r e n ts p o tp r i c e s
To prove claim 7 this section ﬁrst derives the set of admissible time paths of cur-
rent spot prices (as in deﬁnition 6). It then shows that the admissible time paths
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satisfy suﬃcient conditions for dynamic stability as in deﬁnition 2. In proving
claim 7 the discussion will be based on the young individual’s optimization be-
haviour. (The behaviour of the old individual is simple, he wants to spend all
his money for consumption at the prevailing prices.)
4.1 Admissibility of time paths of current spot prices
Assume that today’s event is a non-sunspot (if today’s event is sunspot the
treatment is similar). The constrained maximization of the young individual’s
expected utility will involve constrained maximization of two separate prob-
lems: (i) constrained maximization of a deterministic utility in a fully certain
environment given a sunspot future event with price pθ; and (ii) constrained
maximization of a deterministic utility in a fully certain environment given a
non-sunspot future event with price pδ. In this section the admissibility of time
paths of prices in case (i) is considered; the admissibility of time paths of prices
in case (ii) is then obvious. Accordingly, throughout the discussion here it is
assumed that while a sunspot future price pθ is considered, the current spot
price pδ
t (τ) adjusts to clear the markets.
The young individual observes a sunspot event (with a price pθ)a n dt h e n
considers an (initial) current spot price pδ
t (0) that might clear the market. He
conducts his deterministic constrained utility maximization, knowing that the
future natural event is sunspot. (Henceforth notation will be upset slightly by
adding the subscripts c1,c 2,a n dm to the letter z to indicate excess demand in
9each respective market.) The existence of current spot market equilibrium prices
depends on the question: at the initial price pδ
t (0),d o e st h eq u a n t i t yz
b(δ)
t (0)c2
(i.e., the initial old individual’s excess demand for consumption) coincide with
−z
a(δ)
t (0)c1 (i.e., the initial young individual’s excess supply of consumption)?
Clearly, at the arbitrary initial price pδ
t (0) the coincidence of the above two
initial quantities does not hold in general. Therefore the initial price will have to
adjust according to (6). At the new price pδ
t (0 + dτ) there will be new quantities
c
b(δ)
2 (0 + dτ) and c
a(δ)
1 (0 + dτ).
Figure 1 addresses the issue of the admissibility of the time paths of current
spot prices using the inter-temporal budget constraint of the young individual
(see also Abraham (2005)).
Given an expected price pθ, point A corresponds to a target point of the
young individual’s demands at price pδ
t (0);a n dp o i n tD corresponds to his target
point of demands at price pδ
t (0 + dτ). By construction, at price pδ
t (0 + dτ),
point A is a current spot market disequilibrium position, from which the young
individual should move to the new target point D. Clearly, the movement from
A to D depends on whether the old individual would be willing to carry out
such a trade.
At price pδ
t (0 + dτ),p o i n t sA and D are each cut by three lines. Each line is
a geometric place of constant value. At point D, the line za
t (0 + dτ)c2 =0is
individual a0s excess demand for future consumption; and by construction the
v a l u eo ft h i se x c e s sd e m a n di sz e r o .A tp o i n tD, the excess demands for c1 and
m are also zero. At point A, the line z
a(δ)
t (0)c2 =ˆ c2 is an excess demand for c2
whose constant value is ˆ c2 < 0 . The constant excess demands for c1 and m,a t
point A,a r ep o s i t i v e( ˆ c1 > 0) and negative (ˆ m<0), respectively.
At price pδ
t (0 + dτ), the signs of the young individual’s excess demands at
points A and D in Figure 1 are set in Table 1.
Table 1
c1 m c2
A ˆ c1 > 0 ˆ m<0 ˆ c2 < 0
D 0 0 0
If the young individual is a price taking optimizer, then at the given price
pδ
t (0 + dτ) his trade with the old (to move from A towards D)i sf e a s i b l ei f
it concurrently satisﬁes conditions [a] and [b] of deﬁnition 5. The geometric
interpretation of [a] and [b] is the following.
Condition [a] means that trade should be conducted only within the bound-
aries of the set ACDF in Figure 1. Condition [b] means that trade should
be conducted on the surface of the young individual’s inter-temporal budget.
Thus, trade that maintains conditions [a] and [b] of deﬁnition 5 is one that
geometrically is conﬁned to the surface of the set ACDF. The translation of
feasible trade to quantities of trade means that for ˙ ps
t (0)dτ there exist trades
α˙ ω
a(δ)





1 (0)dτ,0 <α≤ 1 | ACDF
o
(read: α˙ ωa(δ) (0)dτ,0 <α≤ 1,
10conﬁned to the surface of the set ACDF)as e to ffeasible trades.
Clearly, a sequence of sets, whose geometric structure is similar to the set
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The above admissible time path of prices maintain suﬃcient conditions for dy-
namic stability of current spot prices as in deﬁnition 2. To demonstrate this
refer to the table below.
Table 2
c1 m c2
old (h = b) + −
young (h = a) 0 0 0
Assume, without restricting generality, that Table 2 contains the signs of the
old and the young individuals’ excess demands after trade has been concluded at
price pδ
t (0 + dτ). Note that in the c1− column the positive sign means that the
old individual has positive excess demand for current output; and the zero sign
means that the young individual is satisﬁed with the level of his consumption
at the prevailing prices.
To reduce the magnitudes of the excess demands in Table 2, the commodity
price pδ
t (τ) should increase according to (6). The diﬃculty here is that any
ﬁnite increase in pδ
t (τ) will upset the young individual’s zero excess demands;
consequently the suﬃciency conditions for dynamic stability may not be satis-
ﬁed. To overcome this problem, two conditions must hold along the admissible
time path of current spot prices:
1. the change in pδ
t (τ),a c c o r d i n gt o( 6 ) ,m u s tb einﬁnitesimal; and,
2. while pδ
t (τ) changes, the young individual should instantaneously trade
with the old while perpetually maintaining the zero value of his excess
demands, z
a(δ)
t (τ)c2 = z
a(δ)
t (τ)c1 = z
a(δ)
t (τ)m =0 ,∀τ ∈ [0,1].
The outcome of conditions 1. and 2. is an admissible time path of current
spot prices along which the young individual’s direct utility coincides perpetu-
ally with his indirect utility. Clearly, conditions 1. and 2. above guarantee the
maintenance of deﬁnion 2 of dynamic stability; and thus, suﬃcient conditions
for dynamic stability of current spot prices are satisﬁed.
115 Sunspot equilibria exist but are unlikely to
occur
This section will prove the existence of sunspot equilibria (as per proposition 4).
It will then demonstrate two important qualiﬁcations: (a) despite their existence
sunspot equilibria are, in general, unlikely to occur (as per proposition 8); and
(b) the corollary, namely, adding an asset to this economy will generally render
proposition 4 invalid.
5.1 Existence of sunspot equilibria
To prove proposition 4 it is shown that, whilst (5) is maintained, there exist two
expected prices, pθ and pδ ¡
pθ 6= pδ¢
, such that, the limit of the ﬁrst (second)
time path of prices in (4) is the expected price in the second (ﬁrst) time path.
Consider the time paths of prices in (3). In the ﬁrst time path in (3), for
each initial price pδ (0) and for a given expected price ps = pθ,t h e r ee x i s t sa
limit price pδ
t that is a current spot market equilibrium price (as has been shown
in claim 7). In the second time path, for each initial price pθ (0) and for a given
expected price ps = pδ there exists a limit price pθ
t that is a current spot market
equilibrium price. Therefore, for a continuum of expected prices in the closed
interval of positive values [ε,¯ ε] there exist (according to claim 7), respectively,
a continuum of current spot market equilibrium prices pδ
t ∈ [ε,¯ ε] and pθ
t ∈ [ε,¯ ε].
By virtue of the continuity of pδ
t and pθ
t in the closed interval [ε,¯ ε],t h e r ee x i s t s
a ﬁxed point pδ
t ∈ [ε,¯ ε] and pθ
t ∈ [ε,¯ ε] for which, respectively, pδ
t = pδ and
pθ
t = pθ as in (4). Furthermore, because of the uniqueness of each time path in
(3), pδ 6= pθ; i.e., sunspot equilibria exist in the economy.
5.2 Sunspot equilibria are unlikely to occur
Proposition 4 established that there exist prices pθ,p δ ∈ [ε,¯ ε] that are sunspot
equilibria. Furthermore, since the Markov process π is stationary, these prices
will perpetuate over time. Obviously, this result is a direct consequence of the
stationary economy where the frequency of sunspot equilibria is an irrelevant
issue.
For a ‘proper’ theory of sunspot equilibria one should establish that when
π is non-stationary, all prices pθ,p δ ∈ [ε,¯ ε] are self fulﬁlling and therefore are
sunspot equilibria; i.e., that the sets of rational expectations equilibria and
sunspot equilibria coincide. The frequency of sunspot equilibria then becomes
a relevant issue. It is known, however, that ‘most’ (in a topological sense (e.g.
Guillemin and Pollack (1974), pp. 119-130)) continuous maps on compact sets
are Lefschetz. Therefore, ‘most’ ﬁxed points in proposition 4 are isolated for
a non-stationary π. This implies that, unfortunately, sunspot equilibria are
unlikely to occur despite their existence.
125.3 A corollary
Adding an extra asset (e.g., a bond g) to the economy will generally render
proposition 4 invalid. To give eﬀect to this claim assume that the economy has
reached the following conceivable position of excess demands.
Table 3
c1 m g c2
old (h = b) + 0 ↓ -
young (h = a) 0 ↑ + - 0
The only feasible trade is between c1 and m as is shown (in Table 3) by the
arrows in the respective columns of excess demands. Thus, based on conditions
1. and 2. in section 4.2, trade between the two individuals must be carried out
such that the positive excess demands decline while maintaining the zero excess
demands. In general, however, the maintenance of the zero excess demands
requires here (unlike in the previous economy) a violation of the quid pro quo,
expressed in condition [b] of deﬁnition 5. Based on the above, it is clear that,
in general, there are no admissible paths of current spot prices that maintain
(3). In general, therefore sunspot equilibria do not exist.
The introduction of money as a numeraire and as a medium of exchange
would add the two regions ABC and DEF to the feasible set of trades in Fig-
ure 1. However, this would still leave the above impasse unresolved because
exchanging money against other goods in a direction opposite to excess de-
mand for money would result in a depletion of the money stock and a return
to the above inconsistency. Moreover, an increase of the stock of money during
the price adjustment process would still leave the problem unresolved because
of the classical dichotomy — any increment in the stock of money would upset
the absolute level of prices without adding any additional purchasing power to
the individuals.
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